Abstract-We investigate the economics of internet of things (IoT). An economic model of IoT consists of end users, advertisers and three different kinds of providers. We model different kinds of interaction among the providers as a combination of sequential and parallel non-cooperative games. We characterize the equilibrium pricing strategy and payoff of providers and corresponding demands of end users in each such setting. We quantify the impact of advertising revenue on the equilibrium pricing and demands, and compare the payoffs and demands for different interaction models.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) is a world-wide network where various kinds of objects such as sensors, RFID tags, robots and smart phones will interact and operate with minimal human intervention. IoT has several applications-such as in smart grid, e-Health service, smart transportation system, and home automation. Research has been initiated to combat the technical challenges associated with IoT [1] . Compressed sensing techniques have been developed to acquire information in an efficient manner IoT [2] . However, the economic aspects of IoT are largely ignored. Large scale proliferation of IoT will critically depend on rendering it profitable to all the entities in the IoT paradigm. We seek to contribute in this space.
We first characterize the entities involved in IoT architecture: end-users (e.g. individuals, organization, government agencies), advertisers, and providers. There are three different kind of providers in IoT-IoT Service Provider (IoTSP), Wireless Service Provider (WSP), and Cloud Service Provider (CSP). IoT service will be provided by IoTSP (e.g. Apple 1 ) similar to Internet service provided by ISP. CSP will help to store and process the enormous amount of data generated in IoT. WSP will enable the communication amongst devices and between the devices and the providers 2 . Online advertisement will generate revenue for IoTSP as well as additional traffic for WSP and CSP, and additional reimbursement for them.
We seek to develop an economic model where different providers choose their actions in order to maximize their individual payoffs. We consider a monopolistic setting, i.e. there is one IoTSP, one WSP and one CSP. We consider two different interaction models. In the push or centralized model, the IoTSP procures the bandwidth and computing resources from the WSP and the CSP respectively and offers a package p to end-users ( Fig. 1) 3 . On the other extreme in a decentralized setting or pull model, each provider separately quotes a price to end-users, an end-user procures the service by paying all the providers separately ( Fig. 1) . In both the models, the demand of end-users decrease (increase, respectively) with the increase (decrease, resp.) in price that an end-user has to pay. In the pull model, the price charged by all providers directly influence the demand. In the push model, the price charged by IoTSP (WSP, CSP, respectively) directly (indirectly, resp.) influence the demand. The indirect influence in the push model is the following-if either WSP ( or, CSP) increases its price charged to IoTSP, then the IoTSP also has to increase its price quoted to end-users which in turn will decrease the demand. Thus, the providers' payoffs are not maximized either at very high price or at very low price. We characterize the pricing strategy and payoff of each provider in both models in a game theoretic setting.
In presence of advertisement revenue, it is expected that each provider's payoff will increase. If advertisement volume increases in the push (pull, respectively) model IoTSP (enduser, resp.) has to pay WSP and CSP more for the additional traffic which increases WSP and CSP's payoffs but also decreases IoTSP's revenue (demand of end-users, resp.). Additionally, advertisement revenue may enable IoTSP to decrease its price leading to an increase in demand which in turn also increases the payoff of WSP and CSP. We characterize the impact of advertisement revenue on each provider's pricing strategy and payoff as well as on the overall demand.
The overall strategic interactions (or, game) consists of three (two, resp.) stages (or, sub-games) in push (pull, resp.) model. First, IoTSP and advertisers jointly decide the advertisement price and the advertisement traffic to WSP and CSP (Subgame 1) in both the models. IoTSP and advertisers inform the same to all the providers. Then, providers interact either in a push framework or pull framework. In the sub-game 2 of the push model, WSP and CSP quote their prices in parallel, in sub-game 3 of the push model, IoTSP selects its price with the knowledge of the prices quoted by WSP and CSP (Section III-A). We characterize the Sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) pricing strategy of the above game (Section III-B). Our analysis reveals-
• There is a unique SPNE when the advertisement revenue per user is below a certain threshold (say, T), but there are infinitely many SPNEs when the advertisement revenue per user exceeds T (Theorem 1) .
• Price charged by IoTSP (payoff of IoTSP, respectively) decreases (increases,resp.) as the advertisement revenue per user increases when it is below T (Theorem 2, Corollary 1, resp.). At and above T, the IoTSP can sustain a service at a free of cost i.e. it sets its price at 0 (Theorem 2). IoTSP's payoff becomes constant when the advertisement revenue per user exceeds T (Corollary 2); thus, IoTSP only retains a fixed share from the advertisement revenue and the rest is shared between WSP and CSP in this regime.
• Price (payoff, resp.) of WSP (or CSP) increases with the advertisement revenue per user when it is below T (Theorem 1, Corollary 1, resp. ). At and above T, the price (payoff, resp.) will depend on the selection of equilibrium since there are multiple SPNEs, but the sum of the payoffs of WSP and CSP is always unique and increases linearly with the advertisement revenue (Corollary 2).
• Since the demand increases monotonically with the decrease in price quoted by IoTSP, thus, the demand increases when advertisement revenue per user is below T (Corollary 1). At and above T, the demand remains constant at the maximum value (Corollary 2). In the pull model, since an end-user independently pays IoTSP, WSP, and CSP, thus, in the sub-game 2 4 , providers jointly select prices for end-users in a non cooperative game setting (Section IV-A). We fully characterize the Nash equilibrium (NE) pricing strategy and the payoffs of providers in this setting (Section IV-B).
• Unlike the push model, there is a unique NE in the pull model for all sets of parameters (Theorem 3).
• Payoff of IoTSP increases with advertisement for all sets of parameters (Corollary 3 and Corollary 4). Payoffs of WSP and CSP increase with advertisement revenues per user when it is below a certain threshold (T 1 , say) (Corollary 3) and remain constant when the advertisement revenue per user exceeds T 1 (Corollary 4). Thus, unlike the push model, IoTSP grabs all the advertisement revenue when advertisement revenue per user becomes very high.
• Total payment that an end-user has to make decreases (remains constant, resp.) when the advertisement revenue per user is below T 1 (at and above T 1 , resp.) (Theorem 3).
• The behavior of demand is similar to the push model (Corollaries 3 & 4). Only difference is that when the advertisement revenue per user exceeds T 1 then it remains constant at a value lower than the maximum value (Corollary 4). We compare the payoffs and the demand associated with these two models (Section V)-
• IoTSP's payoff is the highest in the pull model (Corollary 6).
• Demand and thus, the reach of the IoT technology, is higher in the pull (push, respectively) model for low (high, respectively) advertisement revenue per user regime (Corollary 5).
• The payoff of WSP (or CSP) is the highest (lowest, respectively) in the pull model in the low (high , resp.)advertisement revenue per user regime (Corollary 7). Related Literature: To the best of our knowledge this is the first investigation of the economic aspect of interactions among providers of different kinds in an IoT setting. However, pricing strategy in a system consisting of only one kind of provider has been extensively studied e.g. ISP [3] , WSP [4] , [5] or CSP [6] , [7] . But different modes of interactions like push and pull naturally arise when there are multiple kinds of providers as in IoT. Payoff functions of different kinds of providers are also different; for example advertisers directly pay only IoTSP, while WSP and CSP only gets indirect share of the advertisement revenue either from end-users or IoTSP.
The closest to our work are some recent works on netneutrality which consider the interaction between ISP and Content provider (CP) [8] , [9] . [8] considers a setting similar to the push model where the ISP only charges CP and CP charges end-users. [9] considers that ISP and CP both charge the endusers (similar to the pull model in our setting). But the pricing game in the IoT context requires different problem formulation. For example [8] needs a purely sequential game where first CP selects its price and then ISP selects its price; but the push model which is the closest to [8] needs a combination of a sequential and a parallel game; in the first stage of this interaction, WSP and CSP select their prices in parallel and then IoTSP selects its price. The results are also substantially different. For example, [8] shows that there always exists a unique SPNE. But we find that there may be infinitely many SPNEs in the push model. Moreover, we consider optimal pricing strategy of IoTSP for advertisement volume which is not considered in [8] , [9] . The consideration of optimal pricing strategy for advertisement requires an additional game between IoTSP and advertisers where IoTSP quotes a price for advertisement and advertisers select the advertisement volume before providers select pricing strategies in the push and pull framework. Further, references [8] , [9] did not characterize the payoffs in the setting when one of the provider's price becomes zero, but we have fully characterized the payoffs of all providers in all possible settings. The above characterization enables us to study the impact of high advertisement revenue per user on individual payoff and the results are quite different from the low advertisement revenue setting. We also consider that WSP and CSP charge additionally for advertisement data delivered to end-users. We also analytically provide comparison of the payoffs of providers and demand in two different models. The consideration of above factors provide us novel insights.
Due to the space constraint, all proofs have been deferred to the tech-report [10] .
II. PLAYERS, DECISION VARIABLES AND PARAMETERS
We investigate a monopoly where there is one provider of each kind i.e. there is one IoTSP, WSP and CSP.
IoTSP decides a price p I ≥ 0 for an IoT application 5 . The price may be a periodic subscription fee or may be the price per application 6 . WSP decides a charge of p w ≥ 0 per data (in bytes). We consider a usage based pricing scheme, but our result can be easily generalized for flat rate pricing schemes. CSP decides a charge of p c ≥ 0 for each unit of resource or capacity. Similar kind of pricing is currently employed by Amazon EC2 [11] . IoTSP decides b ≥ 0 for per unit of advertisement volume and in response, advertisers decide the advertisement volume a 1 for each end-user. An IoTSP receives ba 1 amount of advertisement revenue per user. a 1 is a function of b, we only assume that a 1 and b are selected from a closed intervals, thus, ba 1 has at least one maximum. Advertisers also decide the additional cloud resources a 2 required for each enduser for providing customized advertisement. IoTSP informs b, a 1 , a 2 to other providers before they select their prices. We denote-i) the average data flow (in bytes) required for each end-user for IoT application as α; ii) cloud capacities required to serve one end-user as β. Note that α + a 1 (β + a 2 , respectively) is the total data traffic (cloud capacity required, resp.) for each end-user.
In the subsequent sections we first characterize the equilibrium prices and payoffs, then we study the impact of advertisement revenue on the prices, payoffs of providers and the demand of end-users; subsequently, we analyze how IoTSP should select b in order to maximize its own payoff.
III. PUSH MODEL A. System Model
End-users pay IoTSP and IoTSP shares its revenue with WSP and CSP ( fig. 1 ). The demand of end-users only depends on the price of IoTSP i.e. p I . We assume that the demandresponse of end-users follows a linear relationship-
where d denotes the price sensitivity 7 of end-users, D max is the maximum demand.
IoTSP attains D push ba 1 amount from the advertisement, but, it also has to pay p w (α + a 1 )D push amount to WSP and p c (β + a 2 )D push amount to CSP. Thus, IoTSP's payoff is
We consider a non co-operative game where each provider only tries to maximize its own payoff. In the first stage IoTSP decides b and in response, advertisers jointly decide a 1 and a 2 (sub-game 1). With the knowledge of b, a 1 and a 2 providers then quote prices in the push model where we consider a combination of sequential and parallel pricing games. At the second stage (sub-game 2), WSP and CSP decide their prices they will charge in parallel i.e. the pricing strategy (p * c , p * w ), and in the third stage IoTSP selects its price p * I with the knowledge of prices of WSP and CSP (sub-game 3). We seek to obtain SPNE of the above game.
Definition 1.
[12] A Sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) strategy profile is an NE [12] at every subgame.
In Section III-B we obtain the prices and payoffs of providers in terms of b, a 1 and a 2 , subsequently in Section III-C we will show how IoTSP should select b.
B. Results

1) Equilibrium
Price: NE Pricing strategy of IoTSP at Sub-game 3: Lemma 1. Unique NE pricing strategy p * I in sub-game 3 is
NE pricing strategy of WSP and CSP at sub-game 2:
When dba 1 ≥ 5D max , then any (p * w , p * c ) which satisfies the following conditions constitutes an NE in this sub-game
Note that ba 1 − 3D max /d ≥ 2D max /d when dba 1 ≥ 5D max . Thus, the interval from which WSP and CSP select their prices given in (8) and (9) respectively is non-empty. Though there is a unique equilibrium when dba 1 ≤ 5D max , there are infinitely many equilibria in the sub-game 2 when dba 1 > 5D max . But the sum of payment received by WSP and CSP from IoTSP for each end-user is unique and increases linearly (by (10)) even when dba 1 > 5D max . Note that both p * w and p * c increase with ba 1 when dba 1 < 5D max since IoTSP reduces its price charged to end-users in this setting. Replacing the values of (p * w , p * c ) in (5): Theorem 2. At SPNE,
Though (p * w , p * c ) are not always unique, p * I is always unique. p * I decreases with ba 1 and ultimately becomes 0 when dba 1 ≥ 5D max . Though IoTSP has to share its revenue with WSP and CSP, still IoTSP sets price at 0 when ba 1 ≥ 5D max /d. Note that the total advertisement revenue procured by IoTSP is ba 1 D push . Thus, when ba 1 is very high, then IoTSP can procure high advertisement revenue by selecting small price which in turn increases the demand D push .
2) Payoffs of providers and Demand of end-users: -a) dba 1 < 5D max :
Corollary 1 shows that the demand D push increases with increase in ba 1 when ba 1 < 5D max since price charged by IoTSP decreases with ba 1 . The payoffs of providers increase quadratically with ba 1 (fig.2) . Thus, if IoTSP can procure high ba 1 , then, it not only increases the payoff of IoTSP, but it also increases the payoffs of WSP and CSP. WSP and CSP attain strictly higher payoffs compared to IoTSP. b) dba 1 ≥ 5D max : Now we evaluate the demand and payoffs at equilibrium when dba 1 ≥ 5D max . Since the SPNE is not unique in this case we consider the worst possible payoffs for WSP (Ũ w,push ) and CSP (Ũ c,push ).
Note that though there are infinite SPNEs in this case, IoTSP's payoff as well as the sum of the payoffs of WSP and CSP are always unique. This happens because the price selected by IoTSP and the sum of payments received by WSP and CSP are always unique. The worst case payoffs of WSP and CSP are strictly higher compared to the payoff of IoTSP. From (12) , the payoff of IoTSP is independent of ba 1 ( fig.2) . Thus, IoTSP retains only a constant amount of revenue from the advertisement. The rest of the advertisement revenue is shared between CSP and WSP ( by 13)). From Corollary 1 and 2 it is easy to verify that each provider's payoff is strictly higher compared to the maximum possible payoff attainable at the setting when dba 1 < 5D max . Corollary 2 shows that the demand becomes equal to the maximum possible value since price charged by IoTSP becomes 0.
C. IoTSP's optimal price for advertisers in Sub-game 1
Note from Corollaries 1 and 2 that U I,push is a nondecreasing function in ba 1 . Since IoTSP selects b, and a 1 is a function of b, thus, IoTSP will select b in order to maximize ba 1 . Recall from Section II that there exists at least one b where ba 1 is maximized, thus, IoTSP will select b among one of those global maxima. If the maximum ba 1 < 5D max /d, then U I,push is given by Corollary 1, otherwise it is equal to the expression given in Corollary 2.
IV. PULL MODEL A. System Model
IoTSP, WSP and CSP all directly charge prices to end-users ( fig. 1 ). An end-user needs to pay p w (α + a 1 ) and p c (β + a 2 ) amount to WSP and CSP respectively. Thus, the demand is
We consider the same price sensitivity parameter for the prices of different providers 8 . Since IoTSP does not pay either WSP or CSP, thus
In the first stage (Sub-game 1) IoTSP selects b and in response advertisers select a 1 and a 2 . With the knowledge of b, a 1 and a 2 , providers quote their prices to end-users. Since each provider independently quotes its price, thus, in the second stage (Sub-game 2) we consider a non co-operative game where each provider simultaneously selects its price. In Section IV-B we find NE pricing strategy profile (p * I , p * w , p * c ) and payoffs of providers in terms of b, a 1 and a 2 ; subsequently, in Section IV-C we discuss how IoTSP should select b.
B. Results 1) Equilibrium prices (p *
I , p * w , p * c ) at Sub-game 2: Theorem 3. The NE strategy profile at sub-game 2 is unique-
Note that NE strategy profile is always unique. Also note that the price of IoTSP decreases with ba 1 but that of WSP and CSP increases with ba 1 when ba 1 ≤ D max /3. Note that WSP and CSP select prices such that the total payment that an end-user incurs becomes constant when ba 1 > D max /3.
2) Payoffs of providers and Demand of end-users: a) dba 1 ≤ D max /3:
Note that the demand D pull increases with ba 1 despite that end-users pay WSP for the additional advertisement traffic a 1 ; the increase in ba 1 enables the IoTSP to decrease its price which enhances the demand. Also note that a 2 does not play any role in the demand though end-users have to pay CSP for additional computational resource a 2 . Corollary 3 entails that the providers select prices such that the payoffs are the same for each provider ( fig.3 ) unlike in the push model. Each payoff increases quadratically with ba 1 . Fig. 2 . We consider: d = 1, Dmax = 15. U I,push becomes static when dba 1 ≥ 5Dmax = 75, but U c,push + U w,push linearly increases when ba 1 ≥ 75. Fig. 3 . We consider the same example setting as in fig. 2 . U I,pull and U w,pull are the same for ba 1 ≤ 5, but when ba 1 > 5, U I,pull > U w,pull . Fig. 4 . We consider the same example setting as in fig. 2 . U I,pull is always greater than U I,push .
max /(9d) Corollary 4 entails that the demand becomes independent of ba 1 when dba 1 > D max /3. This is because the total payment that an end-user incurs becomes independent of ba 1 when ba 1 > D max /3 by Theorem 3. Each end-user has to pay WSP and CSP under all cases unlike the push model, thus, the demand never reaches the maximum possible value, D max even when p I = 0. (18) shows that IoTSP's payoff linearly increases with ba 1 and retains all the revenues from advertisement for high values of ba 1 ( fig.3) . Note that IoTSP's payoff is strictly higher compared to the payoffs of WSP and CSP when dba 1 > D max /3 ( fig.3 ).
C. IoTSP's optimal price for advertisers in sub-game 1
Note from Corollaries 3 and 4 that U I,pull is a monotonically increasing function in ba 1 . Thus, IoTSP's payoff is maximized at the maximum possible value of ba 1 . As discussed in Section III-C IoTSP will select b such that maximum ba 1 is attained. If the maximum ba 1 ≤ D max /(3d), then U I,pull is given by Corollary 3, otherwise it is equal to the expression given in Corollary 4.
V. COMPARISON AMONG DIFFERENT MODELS
At initial stages of deployment of IoT technology, it is expected that ba 1 will be small. Thus, if a social planner wants to increases the reach of IoT technology it may recommend the pull model at the initial stage. When ba 1 becomes sufficiently high, social planner then may recommend the push model. When dba 1 is small (large, respectively) the total payment that an end-user incurs is larger (smaller, resp.) in the push model compared to the pull model. This explains the above variation of demand with ba 1 .
A. IoTSP's payoff Corollary 6. For all values of ba 1 , U I,pull > U I,push .
Even though the demand is high in the push model compared to that of pull model for high ba 1 , the IoTSP's payoff is strictly less compared to the pull model ( fig. 4) . This is because, for high ba 1 , the payoff of IoTSP becomes independent of ba 1 in the push model, but in the pull model, the payoff of IoTSP strictly increases with ba 1 even for high ba 1 .
B. Payoffs of WSP and CSP Corollary 7.
• When 0.414D max > dba 1 , U w,pull > U w,push and U c,pull > U c,push .
• At dba 1 = 0.414D max , U w,pull = U w,push and U c,pull = U c,push .
• When dba 1 > 0.414D max , U w,push > U w,pull and U c,push > U c,pull .
Note that for dba 1 ≥ 5D max , even the worst case payoffs of WSP and CSP in the push model are strictly higher compared to that in the pull model. This happens because when ba 1 is small (high, respectively) the demand in the push model is smaller (higher, resp.) compared to the pull model. VI. FUTURE WORK Generalization of our framework to account for an oligopolistic setting is a work for the future.
